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Abstract
Local differential privacy (LDP) is a strong notion of privacy for individual users that often
comes at the expense of a significant drop in utility. The classical definition of LDP assumes
that all elements in the data domain are equally sensitive. However, in many applications,
some symbols are more sensitive than others. This work proposes a context-aware framework
of local differential privacy that allows a privacy designer to incorporate the application’s con-
text into the privacy definition. For binary data domains, we provide a universally optimal
privatization scheme and highlight its connections to Warner’s randomized response (RR) and
Mangat’s improved response. Motivated by geolocation and web search applications, for k-ary
data domains, we consider two special cases of context-aware LDP: block-structured LDP and
high-low LDP. We study discrete distribution estimation and provide communication-efficient,
sample-optimal schemes and information theoretic lower bounds for both models. We show that
using contextual information can require fewer samples than classical LDP to achieve the same
accuracy.
1 Introduction
Differential privacy (DP) is a rigorous notion of privacy that enforces a worst-case bound on the
privacy loss due to release of query results [1]. Its local version, local differential privacy (LDP)
(Definition 1), provides context-free privacy guarantees even in the absence of a trusted data collec-
tor [2, 3, 4]. Under LDP, all pairs of elements in a data domain are assumed to be equally sensitive,
leading to harsh privacy-utility trade-offs in many learning applications. In many real-life settings,
however, some elements are more sensitive than others. For example, in URL applications, users
may want to differentiate sensitive URLs from non-sensitive ones, and in geo-location applications,
users may want to hide their precise location within a city, but not the city itself.
This work introduces a unifying context-aware notion of LDP where different pairs of domain
elements can have “arbitrary” sensitivity levels. For binary domains, we provide a universal op-
timality result and highlight interesting connections to Warner’s response and Mangat’s improved
response. For k-ary domains, we look at two canonical examples of context-aware LDP: block-
structured LDP and high-low LDP. For block-structured LDP, the domain is partitioned into m
blocks and the goal is to hide the identity of elements within the same block but not the block
identity. This is motivated by geo-location applications where users can be in different cities, and
it is not essential to hide the city of a person but rather where exactly within that city a person is
∗JA and ZS are supported by NSF-CCF-1846300 (CAREER), NSF-CRII-1657471 and a Google Faculty Research
Award. Work partially done while ZS was visiting Google.
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(i.e., which bars, restaurants, or businesses they visit). In other words, in this context, users would
like to hide which element in a given block of the domain their data belongs to – and not necessarily
which block their data is in, which may be known from side information or application context. For
high-low LDP, we assume there is a set of sensitive elements and we only require the information
about possessing sensitive elements to be protected. This can be applied in web browsing services,
where there are a large number of URLs and not all of them contain sensitive information.
1.1 Related work
Recent works consider relaxations of DP [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] and LDP [11, 12, 13, 14, 15] that
incorporate the context and structure of the underlying data domain. Indeed, [6, 13] investigate
settings where a small fraction of the domain elements are secrets and require that the adversary’s
knowledge about whether or not a user holds a secret cannot increase much upon the release of
data. [5, 7, 11, 12, 16] model the data domain as a metric space and scale the privacy parameter
between pairs of elements by their distance. [17] considers categorical high dimensional count models
and define privacy measures that help privatize counts that are close in `1 distance.
To investigate the utility gains under this model of privacy, we consider the canonical task
of distribution estimation: Estimate an unknown discrete distribution given (privatized) samples
from it. The trade-off between utility and privacy in distribution estimation has received recent
attention, and optimal rates have been established [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23]. These recent works show
that the sample complexity for k-ary distribution estimation up to accuracy α in total variation
distance increases from Θ
(
k
α2
)
(without privacy constraints) to Θ
(
k2
α2ε2
)
(for ε = O(1)) when we
impose ε-LDP constraints. For both the block-structured and high-low models of LDP, we will
characterize the precise sample complexity by providing privatization and estimation schemes that
are both computation- and communication-efficient.
Another line of work considers a slightly different problem of heavy hitter estimation where there
is no distributional assumption under the data samples that the users have and the main focus is on
reducing the computational complexity and communication requirements [24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30].
1.2 Our contributions
Motivated by the limitations of LDP, and practical applications where not all domain elements
are equally sensitive, we propose a general notion of context-aware local differential privacy (see
Definition 2) and prove that it satisfies several important properties, such as preservation under
post-processing, adaptive composition, and robustness to auxiliary information.
When the underlying data domain is binary, we provide a complete characterization of a uni-
versally optimal scheme, which interpolates between Warner’s randomized response and Mangat’s
improved response, given in Theorem 2.
We then consider general data domains and investigate two practically relevant models of
context-aware LDP. The first is the block-structured model and is motivated by applications in
geo-location and census data collection. Under this privacy model, we assume that the underlying
data domain is divided into a number of blocks, and the elements within a block are sensitive. For
example, when the underlying domain is a set of geographical locations, each block can correspond
to the locations within a city. In this case, we would like to privatize the precise value within a par-
ticular block, but the privacy of the block ID is not of great concern (Definition 4). In Theorem 4
we characterize the sample complexity of estimating k-ary discrete distributions under this privacy
model. We also propose a privatization scheme based on the recently proposed Hadamard Response
(HR), which is both computation- and communication-efficient. We then prove the optimality of
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these bounds by proving a matching information-theoretic lower bound. This is achieved by casting
the problem as an information constrained setting and invoking the lower bounds from [31, 32]. We
show that when all the blocks have roughly the same number of symbols, the sample complexity
can be reduced by a factor of the number of blocks compared to that under the classic LDP. See
Theorem 4 for a formal statement of this result.
The second model we consider is the high-low model, where there are a few domain elements that
are sensitive while the others are not. A form of this high-low notion of privacy was proposed in [13],
which also considered distribution estimation and proposed an algorithm based on RAPPOR [33].
We propose a new privatization scheme based on HR that has the same sample complexity as [13]
with a much smaller communication budget. We also prove a matching information theoretic
lower bound showing the optimality of these schemes [13]. In this case, the sample complexity only
depends quadratically in the number of sensitive elements and linearly in the domain size compared
to the quadratic dependence on the domain size under the classic LDP. See Theorem 3 for a formal
statement of this result.
As a consequence of these results, we observe that the sample complexity of distribution esti-
mation can be significantly less than that in the classical LDP. Thus contextual privacy should be
viewed as one possible method to improve the trade-off between the utility and privacy in LDP
when different domain elements have different levels of privacy.
To validate our worst-case (minimax) analyses, we conduct experiments on synthetic data sam-
pled from uniform, geometric, and power law distributions in addition to experiments on over 3.6
million check-ins to 43,750 locations from the Gowalla dataset. Our experiments confirm that
context-aware LDP achieves a far better accuracy under the same number of samples.
1.3 Organization
In Section 2 we define LDP and the problem of distribution estimation. In Section 3 we define
context-aware LDP and provide an operational definition along with some of its specializations.
In Section 4 we provide the optimal privatization scheme for binary domains. In Section 5 and
Section 6 we derive the optimal sample complexity in the high-low model, and block-structured
model respectively. Experimental results are presented in Section 7. We conclude with a few
interesting extensions in Section 8.
2 Preliminaries
Let X be the k-ary underlying data domain, wlog let X = [k] := {1, . . . , k}. There are n users, and
user i has a (potentially) sensitive data point Xi ∈ X . A privatization scheme is a mechanism to
add noise to mask the true Xi’s, and can be represented by a conditional distribution Q
1 : X → Y,
where Y denotes the output domain of the privatization scheme. For y ∈ Y, and x ∈ X , Q (y | x)
is the probability that the privatization scheme outputs y, upon observing x. If we let X and Y
denote the input and output of a privatization scheme, then Q (y | x) = Pr (Y = y | X = x). For
any set S ⊂ Y, we have Q(S | x) := Pr (Y ∈ S | X = x).
Definition 1 (Local Differential Privacy. [2, 4]). Let ε > 0. A conditional distribution Q is ε-locally
differentially private (ε-LDP) if for all x, x′ ∈ X and all S ⊂ Y,
Q (S | x) ≤ eεQ (S | x′) . (1)
Let Qε be the set of all ε-LDP conditional distributions with input [k].
1In the remaining parts of this paper, we use terms privatization scheme, conditional distribution, and channel to
refer to this Q matrix interchangeably.
3
Distribution estimation. Let
∆k := {(p1, . . . , pk) : ∀x ∈ [k], px ≥ 0;
∑
px = 1}
be all discrete distributions over [k]. We assume that the user’s data Xn := X1, . . . , Xn are
independent draws from an unknown p ∈ ∆k. User i passes Xi through the privatization channel
Q and sends the output Yi to a central server. Upon observing the messages Y
n := Y1, . . . , Yn, the
server then outputs pˆ as an estimate of p. Our goal is to select Q from a set of allowed channels Q
and to design an estimation scheme pˆ : Yn → ∆k that achieves the following min-max risk
r(k, n, d,Q) = min
Q∈Q
{
min
pˆ
max
p∈4k
E [d(p, pˆ)]
}
, (2)
where d(·, ·) is a measure of distance between distributions. In this paper we consider the total
variation distance, dTV (p, q) :=
1
2
∑k
i=1 |pi − qi|. For a parameter α > 0, the sample complexity of
distribution estimation to accuracy α is the smallest number of users for the min-max risk to be
smaller than α,
n(k, α,Q) := arg min
n
{r(k, n, dTV,Q) < α}.
When Q is Qε, the channels satisfying ε- LDP constraints with input domain [k], it is now well
established that for ε = O(1) [18, 20, 22, 21, 31, 23],
n(k, α,Qε) = Θ
(
k2
α2ε2
)
. (3)
Hadamard matrix (Sylvester’s construction). Let H1 = [1], then Sylvester’s construction of
Hadamard matrices is a sequence of square matrices of size 2i × 2i recursively defined as
H2m =
[
Hm Hm
Hm −Hm
]
Letting Si = {y | y ∈ [m], H(i + 1, y) = +1} be the column indices of +1’s in the (i + 1)th row of
Hm, we have
• ∀i ∈ [m− 1], |Si| = m2 .
• ∀i 6= j ∈ [m− 1], |Si ∩ Sj | = m4
3 Context-Aware LDP
In local differential privacy, all elements in the data domain are assumed to be equally sensitive,
and the same privacy constraint is enforced on all pairs of them (see (1)). However, in many
settings some domain elements might be more sensitive than others. To capture this, we present
a context-aware notion of privacy. Let E ∈ Rk×k≥0 be a matrix of non-negative entries, where for
x, x′ ∈ [k], εx,x′ is the (x, x′)th entry of E.
Definition 2 (Context-Aware LDP). A conditional distribution Q is E-LDP if for all x, x′ ∈ X
and S ⊆ Y,
Q (S | x) ≤ eεx,x′Q (S | x′) . (4)
This definition allows us to have a different sensitivity level between each pair of elements to
incorporate context information. For a privacy matrix E, the set of all E-LDP mechanisms is
denoted by QE . When all the entries of E are ε, we obtain the classical LDP.
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Symmetric E matrices. When the E matrix is symmetric, context-aware LDP introduces a
similar structure as Metric-based LDP [12], which considers X to be a metric space endowed with
a distance dX . In this case, consider
εx,x′ = εx′,x = dX (x, x′).
It is required that it is harder to distinguish close-by symbols compared to symbols that are rel-
atively far from each other. As a special case, we introduce (later in this section) the notion of
Block-Structured LDP as an example which only requires the elements to be indistinguishable if
they are in the same block.
Asymmetric E matrices. An advantage of our framework is that it allows the matrix E to be
asymmetric. Consider a binary setting where we ask a user whether or not they have used drugs
before. Here, people whose answer is no can occasionally say yes to protect those whose answer
is yes. Thus, when the data collector sees a yes, they are lost as to whether it came from a true
yes answer or a no that was flipped to a yes. Further, there is no need to randomize yes answers
because it is okay for the data collector to know who did not do drugs. This is captured in our
framework by allowing Q(no | no)/Q(no | yes) to be arbitrarily large and placing an upper bound
on Q(yes | yes)/Q(yes | no). A well-known scheme that satisfies this requirement is Mangats
improved randomized response [34]. See Section 4 for more details. This intuition is generalized to
k-ary alphabet in the High-Low LDP model introduced later in this section.
We provide an operational (hypothesis testing) interpretation for context-aware LDP in Sec-
tion 3.1. We show that context-aware LDP is robust to post-processing, robust to auxiliary infor-
mation, and is adaptively composable in Section 3.2.
For binary domains, namely when k = 2, we give a single optimal privatization scheme for all
E matrices in Section 4. For general k, it is unclear whether there is a simple characterization of
the optimal schemes for all E matrices. First note that if ε∗ = mini,j εi,j is the smallest entry of
E, then any ε∗-LDP algorithm is also E-LDP. However, this is not helpful since it does not help
us capture the context of the application and consequently get rid of the stringent requirements of
standard LDP. Motivated by applications in geo-location and web search, we consider structured
E matrices that are both practically motivating, and are paramterized by a few parameters (or a
single parameter) so that they are easier to analyze and implement.
High-Low LDP (HLLDP). The high-low model captures applications where there are certain
domain elements that are private, and the remaining elements are non-private. We only want to
protect the privacy of private elements. This is formalized below.
Definition 3. Let A = {x1, · · · , xs} ⊂ X denote the set of sensitive domain elements, and all
symbols in B := X \ A are non-sensitive. A privatization scheme is said to be (A, ε)-HLLDP if
∀S ⊂ Y, and x ∈ A, x′ ∈ X ,
Q(S | x) ≤ eεQ(S | x′), (5)
which corresponds to the following E matrix:
εx,x′ =
{
ε, x ∈ A,
∞, x ∈ B.
This implies that when the input symbol is in A, the output distribution cannot be multiplica-
tively larger than the output distribution for any other symbol, but there is no such restriction
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for symbols in B. HLLDP was also defined in [13]. We solve the problem of minimax distribution
estimation under this privacy model in Section 5.
Block-Structured LDP (BSLDP). In applications such as geo-location, it is important to pre-
serve the privacy of symbols that are close to each other. We consider this model where the data
domain is divided into various blocks (e.g., the cities), and we would like the symbols within a
block (e.g., the various locations within a city) to be hard to distinguish. This is formalized below.
Definition 4. Suppose there is a partition of X , which is Π = {X1,X2, ...,Xm}. With a slight
abuse of notation, we define ∀x ∈ Xi,Π(x) := i. Then ∀ε > 0, a privatization scheme is said to be
(Π, ε) - BSLDP if it satisfies ∀x, x′ ∈ Xi such that Π(x) = Π(x′), and any S ⊂ Y, we have
Q(S | x) ≤ eεQ(S | x′), (6)
which corresponds to the following E matrix:
εx,x′ =
{
ε, Π(x) = Π(x′),
∞, Π(x) 6= Π(x′).
This definition relaxes the local version of differential privacy in the following way. Given a
partition of the input set Π = {X1,X2, ...,Xm}, it requires different levels of indistinguishablitity
for element pairs in the same block and those in different blocks. We solve the problem of minimax
distribution estimation under this model in Section 6.
3.1 Operational interpretation of context-aware LDP
Recall that the entries of E denote the amount of privacy across the corresponding row and column
symbols. We provide an operational interpretation of E-LDP by considering a natural hypothesis
testing problem. Suppose we are promised that the input is in {x, x′} for some symbols x, x′ ∈ [k],
and an E-LDP scheme outputs a symbol Y ∈ Y. Given Y , the goal is to test whether the input is
x or x′.
Theorem 1 (Operational Interpretation of Context-Aware LDP). A conditional distribution Q is
E-locally differentially private if and only if for all x, x′ ∈ X and all decision rules Xˆ : Y → {x, x′},
PFA(x, x
′) + eεx′,xPMD(x, x′) ≥ 1, (7)
eεx,x′PFA(x, x
′) + PMD(x, x′) ≥ 1, (8)
where PFA(x, x
′) = Pr(Xˆ = x | X = x′) is the false alarm rate and PMD(x, x′) =
Pr(Xˆ = x′ | X = x) is the miss detection rate.
The proof is provided in Section A.4. Consider a test for distinguishing x and x′ given above
in Theorem 1. Figure 1 shows the effective error regions for any estimator Xˆ under the privacy
constraints εx,x′ and εx′,x. We can see that unlike the symmetric region under LDP, we are pushing
the miss detection rate to be higher when εx,x′ < εx′,x. This shows that symbol x is more private
than symbol x′, namely we want to protect the identity of symbol being x more than we want to
protect the identity being x′.
6
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(a) Error Region for Standard LDP.
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Figure 1: Error region for hypothesis testing between i and j under DP constraints
3.2 Properties of context-aware LDP
Context-aware LDP also satisfies several important properties held by classical LDP, including
post-processing, adaptive composition and robustness to auxiliary information. We provide their
proofs in Section A.
Proposition 1 (Preservation under post-processing). Let A1 : X → Y1 be an E-LDP scheme and
A2 : Y1 → Y2 is any algorithm that processes the output of A1, then the scheme A = A2 ◦ A1 is
also E-LDP.
Proposition 2 (Adaptive composition). Let A1 : X → Y1 be an E1-LDP scheme and A2 : X×Y1 →
Y2 be an E2-LDP scheme, then the scheme A defined as (A1,A2) is (E1 + E2)-LDP.
Proposition 3 (Robustness to auxiliary information). Let p∗ be a prior we have over X and
A : X → Y be an E-LDP scheme. Then ∀x1, x2 ∈ X and y ∈ Y,
Pr (X = x1 | Y = y)
Pr (X = x2 | Y = y) ≤ e
εx1,x2
p∗(x1)
p∗(x2)
.
4 Binary Domains
Consider a binary domain, namely k = 2 and domain elements {1, 2}. In this case, we have
E =
[
0 ε1,2
ε2,1 0
]
.
Perhaps the oldest and simplest privatization mechanism is Warner’s randomized response for
confidential survey interviews [2]. In this section, we give the optimal scheme for all utility functions
that obey the data processing inequality under all possible binary constraints. We prove that when
ε1,2 = ε2,1, the optimal scheme is Warner’s randomized response.
Consider the composition of two privatization mechanisms Q ◦W where the output of the first
mechanism Q is applied to another mechanism W . We say that a utility function U(·) obeys the
data processing inequality if for all Q and W
U(Q ◦W ) ≤ U(Q) .
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In other words, further processing of the data can only reduce the utility. Such utility functions
are ubiquitous. For example, in the minimax distribution learning context of this paper, U(Q) may
be chosen as −minpˆ maxp E [d(p, pˆ)] (i.e., the negative of the minimax risk under a fixed mechanism
Q) with d being any `p distance or f -divergence.
Theorem 2 (Optimal Mechanism for Binary Domains). Let X be a binary input alphabet and
U(Q) be any utility function that obeys the data processing inequality. Then for any ε1,2, ε2,1 ≥ 0,
the following privatization mechanism
Q∗ =
[
eε2,1 − 1 1− e−ε1,2
e−ε1,2 (eε2,1 − 1) eε2,1 (1− e−ε1,2)
]
eε2,1 − e−ε1,2 (9)
solves
maximize
Q
U(Q) subject to Q ∈ QE .
Here ∀x, y ∈ {1, 2}, Q∗(x, y) := Q∗(y | x).
As a special case of the above theorem, if we consider the original local differential privacy setup
where ε1,2 = ε2,1 = ε, then the optimal mechanism for binary alphabets is
Q∗ =
1
eε + 1
[
eε 1
1 eε
]
. (10)
This is Warner’s randomized response model in confidential structured survey interview with p =
eε/(eε+1) [2]. Warner’s randomized response was shown to be optimal for binary alphabets in [35].
Another interesting special case of the above theorem is Mangat’s improved randomized response
strategy [34]. To see this, let ε1,2 =∞ and p = e−ε2,1 . Then
Q∗ =
[
1− p p
0 1
]
. (11)
This is exactly Mangat’s improved randomized response strategy. Thus Mangat’s randomized
response with p = e−ε2,1 is optimal for all utility functions obeying the data processing inequality
under this generalized differential privacy framework with ε1,2 =∞, which corresponds to the case
where element 1 is not sensitive.
5 Distribution Estimation under HLLDP
We characterize the optimal sample complexity of distribution estimation under the high-low model
(see Definition 3).
Theorem 3. Let A ⊂ X , with |A| = s < k/2, and ε = O(1). Let QA,ε be the set of all possible
channels satisfying (A, ε)-HLLDP, then:
n(k, α,QA,ε) = Θ
(
s2
α2ε2
+
k
α2ε
)
. (12)
When the size of the sensitive set is relatively large, e.g. s >
√
k, the sample complexity is
Θ(s2/(α2ε2)), which corresponds to classic LDP with alphabet size s. This question was considered
in [13], which gave an algorithm based on RAPPOR [33] that has the optimal sample complexity,
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but requires Ω(k) bits of communication from each user, which is prohibitive in settings where the
uplink capacity is limited for users. We design a scheme based on Hadamard Response (HR), which
is also sample-optimal but requires only log k bits of communication from each user.
[13] noted that a lower bound of s
2
α2ε2
(the first term in (12)) is immediately implied by previously
known results on distribution estimation under standard LDP ((3) for k = s). However, obtaining
a lower bound equalling the second term was still open. Using the recently proposed technique
in [31], we prove this lower bound in Section 5.2.
5.1 Achievability using a variant of HR
We propose an algorithm based on Hadamard response [23], which gives us a tight upper bound for
k-ary distribution estimation under (A, ε)-high-low LDP. Let s = |A| and S be the smallest power
of 2 larger than s, i.e., S := 2dlog(s+1)e. Let t := k − s be the number of all non-sensitive elements.
Then we have S + t ≤ 2(s + t) = 2k. Let HS be the S × S Hadamard matrix using Sylvester’s
construction. Define the output alphabet to be [S + t] = {1, ..., S + t}. then the channel is defined
as the following: When x ∈ A = [s], we have
Q(y | x) =

2eε
S(eε+1) if y ∈ [S] s.t. HS(x, y) = 1,
2
S(eε+1) if y ∈ [S] s.t. HS(x, y) = −1,
0, if y /∈ [S].
(13)
Else if x /∈ A, we have
Q(y | x) =

2
S(eε+1) , if y ∈ [S],
eε−1
eε+1 , if y = x+ S − s,
0, otherwise.
(14)
It is easy to verify that this scheme satisfies (A, ε)-high-low LDP. Next we construct estimators
based on the observations Y1, Y2, . . . ,Yn and states its performance in Proposition 4. For all i ∈ [s],
p̂i =
2(eε + 1)
eε − 1
(
p̂(Si)− 1
eε + 1
)
− p̂(A), (15)
where
p̂(A) =
eε + 1
eε − 1
(
1
n
n∑
m=1
1{Ym ∈ S} − 2
eε + 1
)
,
p̂(Si) =
1
n
(
n∑
m=1
1{Ym ∈ Si}
)
.
For all i /∈ [s], we simply use the empirical estimates
p̂i =
eε + 1
eε − 1
1
n
(
n∑
m=1
1{Ym = i+ S − s}
)
. (16)
Proposition 4. The estimators defined in (15) and (16) satisfy the following:
E [dTV (pˆ, p)] ≤
√
3s2
n
(
eε + 1
eε − 1
)2
+
√
eε + 1
eε − 1
k
n
. (17)
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Since e
ε+1
eε−1 = O
(
1
ε
)
when ε = O(1), setting the right hand side to be smaller than α gives us the
upper bound part of Theorem 3. For the proof of (17), please see Section C.2. In this scheme, each
user only needs to communicate at most log k+ 1 bits since S + t ≤ 2k while the scheme proposed
in [13] needs Ω(k) bits.
5.2 Lower bound
We now prove the lower bound part of Theorem 3. A lower bound of Ω(s2/ε2α2) follows from (3),
which follows directly from the lower bounds on sample complexity of distribution under standard
ε-LDP (e.g., Theorem IV.1 in [22]).
To prove a lower bound equalling the second term, we use the framework developed in [31] to
prove lower bounds for distributed inference under various information constraints (e.g., privacy
and communication constraints). Their key idea is to design a packing of distributions around the
uniform distribution and show that the amount of information that can be gleaned from the output
of these schemes is insufficient for distribution estimation. In particular, we will use their following
result.
Lemma 1. [Lemma 13][31] Let u be the uniform distribution over [k] and P be a family of distri-
butions satisfying the following two conditions.
1. ∀p ∈ P, we have dTV (p,u) ≥ α.
2. ∀p1 ∈ P, we have
|{p2 ∈ P|dTV (p1,p2) ≤ α
3
}| ≤ Cα.
Suppose Q is the set of all channels we can use to get information about X, then we have the sample
complexity of k-ary distribution learning up to TV distance ±α/3 under channel constraints Q is
at least
Ω
(
log |P| − logCα
maxQ∈Q χ2(Q|P)
)
,
where pQ(uQ) is the distribution of Y when X ∼ p (u), and
χ2(P) := 1|P|
∑
p∈P
dχ2(p
Q,uQ),
dχ2(p,q) :=
∑
y∈Y
(p(y)− q(y))2
q(y)
.
Let k′ = k − s ≥ k/2 be the number of non-sensitive elements. Let Z = {+1,−1}k′ be the set
of k′ bits. For all z ∈ Z, define pz as the following
pz(i) =

1
k +
α
∑k′
j=1 zj
k′ i = 1,
1
k i = 2, 3, ..., s,
1
k +
αzi−s
k′ i = s+ 1, s+ 2, ..., k.
Let PZ = {pz|z ∈ Z} be the set of all distributions defined by z ∈ Z. Let UZ be a uniform
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distribution over set Z. Then we have
χ2(Q|PZ)
=Ez∼UZ [
∑
y∈Y
(pQz (y)− uQ(y))2
uQ(y)
]
=
kα2
k′2
Ez∼UZ [
∑
y∈Y
(
∑k′
i=1(Q(y|1)−Q(y|s+ i))zi)2∑
j∈[k]Q(y|j)
]
≤4α
2
k
∑
y∈Y
∑k′
i=1(Q(y|1)−Q(y|s+ i))2∑
j∈[k]Q(y|j)
.
To bound this quantity, we have the following claim, which we prove in Section D.1.
Claim 1. If ∀ Q ∈ Q, we have: ∀i ∈ {s+ 1, s+ 2, ..., s+ k′}, y ∈ Y,
Q(y|1) ≤ eεQ(y|i),
k′∑
i=1
∑
y∈Y
(Q(y|s+ i)−Q(y|1))2∑
j∈[k]Q(y|j)
= O(εk). (18)
Moreover, we have |P| = 2k′ and
Cα ≤ 2(1−h(1/3)k′),
where h(x) = x log(1/x) + (1− x) log(1/(1− x)). Combining these results and using Lemma 1, we
get the sample complexity is at least
Ω
(
log |P| − logCα
maxQ∈Q χ2(Q|P)
)
= Ω
(
k
α2ε
)
.
6 Distribution Estimation under BSLDP
For distribution estimation under block-structured LDP constraints we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Let ε = O(1), and Π = {X1,X2, ...,Xm} be a partition of X and QΠ,ε be the set of all
possible channels that satisfy (Π, ε)-BSLDP, then
n(k, α,QP,ε) = Θ
(∑m
i=1 k
2
i
α2ε2
)
,
where ∀i ∈ [m], |Xi| = ki and |X | = k =
∑m
i=1 ki.
In the special case when all the blocks have the same size k/m, the sample complexity is
Θ(k2/(mα2ε2)), which saves a factor of m compared classic LDP. In Section 6.1, we describe an
algorithm based on HR that achieves this error. Moreover, it only uses O(log k) bits of commu-
nication from each user. A matching lower is proved bound in Section 6.2, which shows that our
algorithm is information theoretically optimal.
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6.1 Achievablity using a variant of HR
The idea of the algorithm is to perform Hadamard Response proposed in [23] within each block.
Without loss of generality we assume each block Xj = {(j, i) | i ∈ [kj ]}. For each block Xj , j ∈ [m],
we associate a Hadamard matrix HKj with Kj = 2
dlog(kj+1)e. Let Yj = {(j, i) | i ∈ [Kj ]}. For each
x = (j, i) ∈ Xj , we assign the (i+ 1)th row of HKj to x. Define the set of locations of ‘+1’s at the
(i+ 1)th row of HKj to be Sx. Then the output domain is Y := ∪mj=1Yj . The privatization scheme
is given as
Q(Y = (j, i) | X) =

2eε
Kj(1+eε)
, X ∈ Xj , i ∈ SX ,
2
Kj(1+eε)
, X ∈ Xj , i /∈ SX ,
0, elsewhere.
It is easy to verify that this scheme satisfies the privacy constraints. Next we construct estimators
based on Y1, Y2, . . . ,Yn and state the performance in Proposition 5. Let Y (1), Y (2) be the two
coordinates of each output Y . For each j ∈ [m] and x ∈ Xj ,
pˆx =
2(eε + 1)
eε − 1
(
p̂(Sx)− p̂(Xj)
2
)
, (19)
where
p̂(Xj) = 1
n
n∑
t=1
1{Yt(1) = j},
p̂(Sx) =
1
n
n∑
t=1
1{Yt(1) = j, Yt(2) ∈ Sx}.
Proposition 5. Under the unbiased estimator pˆ described in (19), we have:
E
[
`22(pˆ, p)
] ≤ 12 maxi ki
n
(
eε + 1
eε − 1
)2
,
E [dTV (pˆ, p)] ≤ 2(e
ε + 1)
eε − 1
√
3
∑m
j=1 k
2
i
n
. (20)
Since e
ε+1
eε−1 = O
(
1
ε
)
when ε = O(1), we get desired bounds in Theorem 4. For the proof
of (20), see Section C.4. We note here that our algorithm also gives the optimal bound in terms
of `2 distance. A matching lower bound can shown using well established results [18] on LDP by
considering the maximum of expected loss if we put all the mass on each single block.
6.2 Lower bound
We now prove the lower bound part of Theorem 4. The general idea is similar to the proof in
Section 5.2, which is based on Lemma 1. Without loss of generality, we assume all the ki’s are even
numbers 2. We construct a family of distributions as following: Let Z = Z1 × Z2 × · · · × Zm and
∀j ∈ [m],Zj = {+1,−1}
kj
2 . ∀z ∈ Z, we denote the jth entry of z as zj where zj ∈ Zj . Define zj,i
to be the ith bit of zj . ∀j ∈ [m] and i ∈ [kj/2], we have
2If one of the ki’s is odd, we can remove one element from Xj , which will make the problem simpler and the
sample complexity remains unchanged up to constant factors
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pz((j, 2i− 1)) = 1
k
+
2zj,ikjα∑m
t=1 k
2
i
,
pz((j, 2i)) =
1
k
− 2zj,ikjα∑m
t=1 k
2
i
.
Note that ∀z ∈ Z, dTV(pz, u) = α. Moreover, |P| = 2 k2 and |Cα| ≤ 2 k2h(1/3) where h is the
binary entropy function. By Lemma 1, let Q be the set of channels that satisfy (P, ε)-LDP and
PZ = {pz | z ∈ Z}, it would suffice to show that
max
Q∈W
χ2(Q | PZ) = O
(
kα2ε2∑m
i=1 k
2
i
)
. (21)
The proof of (21) is technical and presented in Section D.2.
7 Experiments
We perform experiments on both synthetic data and real data to empirically validate how the
new notion of context-aware LDP and associated algorithms would affect the accuracy of k-ary
distribution estimation. Specifically, we choose the special case of block-structured LDP.
For synthetic data, we set k = 1000, ε = 1. We assume all the blocks to have the same
size and m ∈ {10, 20, 50, 100}. For traditional LDP, we use Hadamard Response [23], one of
the state-of-the-art sample-optimal algorithms. We take n = 1000 × 2i, i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , 9} and
generate samples from the following three distributions: Geometric distribution Geo(λ) where
p(i) ∝ (1 − λ)iλ, Zipf distribution Zipf(λ) where p(i) ∝ (i + 1)−λ and uniform distribution. We
assume the blocks are partitioned based on their indices (the first block is {0, 1, · · · , k/m − 1},
the second is {k/m, k/m + 1, · · · , 2k/m − 1} and so on). For Geometric distribution, we consider
another case where we permute the mass function over the symbols to spread the heavy elements
into multiple blocks, denoted by Geo(λ)∗. The results are shown in Figure 2 and each point is
the average of 10 repetitions of the same experiment. We can see that we get consistently better
accuracy under the notion of block-structured LDP compared to the classical notion. Moreover,
the larger m we have, the better accuracy we get, which is consistent with our analysis.
To validate our algorithm on real datasets, we take the Gowalla user check-in dataset [36],
which consists of user check-in records with location information (latitudes and longitudes) on
the Gowalla website. We take 3671812 check-in records with locations within 25N and 50N for
latitude and 130W and 60W for longitude (mostly within continental US). We round the latitude
and longitude for each record up to accuracy 0.2 and regard records with the same latitude and
longitude as the same location. By doing so, we get a dataset with 43, 750 possible values. Figure 3
shows the empirical distribution of the check-in records of the dataset. We take the empirical
distribution of the records as our ground truth and try to estimate it while preserving the privacy
of each record. We partition latitudes into m1 equal parts and longitudes into m2 equal parts.
The resulting grid will be used as the blocks (m1m2 blocks in total). Table 1 shows the average
dTV error over 100 runs of the experiment for LDP and BS-LDP with different (m1,m2) pairs.
From the table we can see that by switching to block-structured LDP, we can get more meaningful
estimation accuracy compared to classical LDP.
(m1,m2) LDP (5,7) (25, 35) (25, 70)
dTV -error 0.591 0.298 0.108 0.082
Table 1: dTV estimation error under different (m1,m2) pairs.
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8 Conclusion
We presented a unifying context-aware LDP framework and investigated communication, privacy,
and utility trade-offs under both binary and k-ary data domains for minimax distribution estima-
tion. Our theory and experiments on synthetic and real-world data suggest that context-aware
LDP leads to substantial utility gains compared to vanilla LDP. In order to examine the effect of
the number of data partitions in block-structured LDP, our experiments focused on uniform parti-
tioning of geo-location data and examined the utility gains and various partition sizes. In practice
however, non-uniform partitioning can better reflect the different topologies of cities. Thus, more
careful experiments with non-uniform partitions need to performed to better quantify the utility
gains. More broadly, more experiments should be conducted to verify that the gains we see on the
Gowalla dataset are also applicable in other data domains.
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A Proof of Properties
In this section, we prove several properties of Context-Aware LDP stated in Section 3.
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
∀x1, x2 ∈ X and y ∈ Y2, we have:
Pr (A(x1) = y)
Pr (A(x2) = y) =
∑
y′∈Y1 Pr (A1(x1) = y′) Pr (A2(y′) = y)∑
y′∈Y1 Pr (A1(x2) = y′) Pr (A2(y′) = y)
≤ max
y′∈Y1
Pr (A1(x1) = y′)
Pr (A1(x2) = y′) ≤ e
ε1,2
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
∀x1, x2 ∈ X and y1 ∈ Y1, y2 ∈ Y2, we have:
Pr (A1(x1) = y1,A2(x1, y1) = y2)
Pr (A1(x2) = y1,A2(x2, y1) = y2) =
Pr (A1(x1) = y1) Pr (A2(x1, y1) = y2)
Pr (A1(x2) = y1) Pr (A2(x2, y1) = y2) ≤ e
ε
(1)
1,2+ε
(2)
1,2
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Pr (X = x1|Y = y)
Pr (X = x2|Y = y) =
Pr (Y = y|X = x1) Pr (X = x1)
Pr (Y = y|X = x2) Pr (X = x1) ≤ e
ε1,2 p
∗(x1)
p∗(x2)
.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 1
Let Q be an E-LDP scheme from X to Y. Note that X − Y − Xˆ form a Markov chain.
PMD(x, x
′) = Pr
(
Xˆ = x′|X = x
)
=
∑
y∈Y
Pr
(
Xˆ = x′|Y = y
)
Pr (Y = y|X = x)
=
∑
y∈Y
Pr
(
Xˆ = x′|Y = y
)
Q(y|x)
≥
∑
y∈Y
Pr
(
Xˆ = x′|Y = y
)
Q(y|x′)e−εx′,x
= e−εx′,x Pr
(
Xˆ = x′|X = x′
)
= e−εx′,x(1− PFA(x, x′)).
Rearranging the terms gives (7). (8) can be obtained similarly starting with PFA(x, x
′).
Now for the other direction, consider a decision rule that satisfies (7) and (8). For any x, x′ ∈ X
and S ⊂ Y, consider a decision rule that outputs Xˆ = x if Y ∈ S and Xˆ = x′ otherwise. Then we
get,
Q(S|x)
Q(S|x′) =
Pr
(
Xˆ = x|X = x
)
Pr
(
Xˆ = x|X = x′
) = 1− PMD(x, x′)
PFA(x, x′)
,
which is bounded by eεx,x′ according to (8), showing that the scheme is E-LDP.
19
B Proof of Theorem 2
In Section 3.1, we give the operational meaning of context-aware LDP in Theorem 1. For binary
alphabet, if Y is generated using an E-LDP mechanism, the error region for all binary hypothesis
testing rule Xˆ : Y → {1, 2}, denoted by Rε1,2,ε2,1 can be expressed by the convex hull defined by
the following three points:
(P 1FA, P
1
MD) = (1, 0), (P
2
FA, P
2
MD) = (0, 1), (22)
(P 3FA, P
3
MD) = (
eε2,1 − 1
eε1,2+ε2,1 − 1 ,
eε2,1 − 1
eε1,2+ε2,1 − 1), (23)
where PFA = Pr
(
Xˆ = 1|X = 2
)
and PMD = Pr
(
Xˆ = 2|X = 1
)
.
Next we show if we use the scheme expressed in (9), the error region RQ∗ = Rε1,2,ε2,1 . By
Theorem 1, we know RQ∗ ⊂ Rε1,2,ε2,1 . Hence we only need to show the reverse direction. More
specifically, we only need to show the three vertices expressed in (22) and (23) can be achieved.
The two vertices in (22) can be achieved by trivial rules Xˆ = 1 and Xˆ = 2. Next we show the
decision rule
Xˆ(Y ) = Y.
achieves the error in (23). Using this decision rule, we have:
PFA = Pr
(
Xˆ = 1|X = 2
)
=
e−ε1,2 (eε2,1 − 1)
eε2,1 − e−ε1,2 =
eε2,1 − 1
eε1,2+ε2,1 − 1 ,
PMD = Pr
(
Xˆ = 2|X = 1
)
=
1− e−ε1,2
eε2,1 − e−ε1,2 =
eε1,2 − 1
eε1,2+ε2,1 − 1 ,
which completes the proof.
For any other scheme Q ∈ Qε, we have RQ ⊂ Rε1,2,ε2,1 = RQ∗ . Hence by Theorem 20 in [35],
we have if YQ and YQ∗ are the outputs of schemes Q and Q
∗ respectively, there exists a coupling
between YQ and YQ∗ such that X − YQ∗ − YQ forms a Markov chain, which, by data processing
inequality, implies
U(Q) ≤ U(Q∗).
C Upper Bound Proofs
C.1 Estimator for the high-low model
In this section, for the high-low model, we show how the output distribution is related to the input
distribution and construct an estimator based on them. For all i ∈ [s], define set Si = {y|y ∈
[S], HS(i+ 1, y) = +1}. Then using properties of Hadamard matrices in Section 2,
p([S]) :=
2
eε + 1
+
eε − 1
eε + 1
Pr (x ∈ A). (24)
p(Si) := Pr (y ∈ Si) =
∑
x∈[k]
Pr (Y ∈ Si|X = x)px
= pi|Si| 2e
ε
S(eε + 1)
+
∑
x∈A,x 6=i
px
(
|Si ∩ Sx| 2e
ε
S(eε + 1)
+ |Si ∩ Scx|
2
S(eε + 1)
)
+
∑
x/∈A
px|Si| 2
S(eε + 1)
=
1
eε + 1
+
eε − 1
2(eε + 1)
Pr (x ∈ A) + e
ε − 1
2(eε + 1)
pi. (25)
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Once we observe Y1, Y2, . . . ,Yn, we can get the following unbiased empirical estimates: for all
i ∈ [s],
p̂(Si) =
1
n
(
n∑
m=1
1{Ym ∈ Si}
)
, p̂([S]) =
1
n
(
n∑
m=1
1{Ym ∈ S}
)
.
Our estimates for these pi’s will be
p̂i =
2(eε + 1)
eε − 1
(
p̂(Si)− 1
eε + 1
)
− p̂(A), where p̂(A) = e
ε + 1
eε − 1
(
p̂([S])− 2
eε + 1
)
.
For all i /∈ [s], we simply use the empirical estimates
p̂i =
eε + 1
eε − 1
1
n
(
n∑
m=1
1{Ym = i+ S − s}
)
.
C.2 Error bound proof for the high-low model (Proposition 4)
In this section, we bound both the expected `1 risk and `2 risk of the estimator proposed in (15)
and (16).
E
[
`22(pˆ, p)
]
=
k∑
i=1
V ar (p̂i) =
s∑
i=1
V ar (p̂i) +
k∑
i=s+1
V ar (p̂i)
≤
s∑
i=1
[2
(
2(eε + 1)
eε − 1
)2
V ar
(
p̂(Si)
)
+ 2V ar
(
p̂(A)
)
] +
k∑
i=s+1
V ar (p̂i)
=
s∑
i=1
[2
(
2(eε + 1)
eε − 1
)2 p(Si)(1− p(Si))
n
+ 2
p(A)(1− p(A))
n
] +
k∑
i=s+1
V ar (p̂i)
≤ 1
n
(
s∑
i=1
3
(
eε + 1
eε − 1
)2
+
k∑
i=s+1
(
eε + 1
eε − 1
)2 eε − 1
eε + 1
pi(1− e
ε − 1
eε + 1
pi)
)
≤ 1
n
(
3s
(
eε + 1
eε − 1
)2
+
eε + 1
eε − 1
)
. (26)
Similarly, we get
E [`1(pˆ, p)] ≤
√√√√s s∑
i=1
V ar (p̂i) +
√√√√k k∑
i=s+1
V ar (p̂i)
≤
√
3s2
n
(
eε + 1
eε − 1
)2
+
√
eε + 1
eε − 1
k
n
. (27)
C.3 Estimator for the block-structured model
In this section, for the block-structured model, we show how the output distribution is related
to the input distribution and construct an estimator based on them. Let Y (1), Y (2) be the two
coordinates of each output Y . Then for each block Xj and x ∈ Xj , define
p(Xj) := Pr (X ∈ Xj), p(Sx) := Pr (Y (1) = j, Y (2) ∈ Sx).
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Using properties of Hadamard matrices in Section 2, ∀j ∈ [m] and x ∈ Xj ,
p(Sx) = Pr (X ∈ Xj , X 6= x)
(
|Sx ∩ SX | 2e
ε
Kj(1 + eε)
+ |Sx ∩ ScX |
2
Kj(1 + eε)
)
+ px
2eε
Kj(1 + eε)
|Sx|
=
p(Xj)
2
+
eε − 1
2(eε + 1)
px (28)
By observing Y1, Y2, . . . ,Yn, we obtain empirical estimates for p(Xj) and p(Sx) as following. For
each j ∈ [m] and x ∈ Xj ,
p̂(Xj) = 1
n
n∑
t=1
1{Yt(1) = j},
p̂(Sx) =
1
n
n∑
t=1
1{Yt(1) = j, Yt(2) ∈ Sx}.
Then from (28),
pˆx =
2(eε + 1)
eε − 1
(
p̂(Sx)− p̂(Xj)
2
)
is an unbiased estimate for px’s.
C.4 Error bound proof for the block-structured model (Proposeition 5)
In this section, we bound both the expected `1 risk and `2 risk of the estimator proposed in (19).
E
[
`22(pˆ, p)
]
=
∑
x∈X
V ar (pˆx) =
m∑
j=1
∑
x∈Xj
V ar (pˆx)
≤
m∑
j=1
∑
x∈Xj
(
2(eε + 1)
eε − 1
)2(
2V ar
(
p̂(Sx)
)
+
1
2
V ar
(
p̂(Xj)
))
=
(
2(eε + 1)
eε − 1
)2 m∑
j=1
∑
x∈Xj
1
n
(
2p(Sx)(1− p(Sx)) + 1
2
p(Xj)(1− p(Xj))
)
≤
(
2(eε + 1)
eε − 1
)2 m∑
j=1
∑
x∈Xj
3
n
p(Xj)
≤ 12
n
(
eε + 1
eε − 1
)2 m∑
j=1
kjp(Xj)
≤ 12 maxj kj
n
(
eε + 1
eε − 1
)2
.
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For `1 error, using similar steps, we get:
E [`1(p, pˆ)] =
m∑
j=1
∑
x∈Xj
|px − pˆx| ≤
m∑
j=1
√
kj
∑
x∈Xj
V ar (pˆx) ≤
m∑
j=1
2(eε + 1)
eε − 1
√
3k2j
n
p(Xj)
≤ 2(e
ε + 1)
eε − 1
√√√√3∑mj=1 k2j
n
m∑
j=1
p(Xj)
=
2(eε + 1)
eε − 1
√
3
∑m
j=1 k
2
j
n
. (29)
The second last inequality comes from Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
D Lower Bound Proofs
D.1 Proof of Claim 1
By definition, we have
∑
y∈Y
k′∑
i=1
(Q(y|s+ i)−Q(y|1))2∑
1≤i′≤kQ(y|i′)
≤
∑
y∈Y
k′∑
i=1
(Q(y|s+ i)−Q(y|1))2∑
1≤i′≤k′ Q(y|s+ i′) +Q(y|1)
=
∑
y∈Y
( ∑k′
i=1Q(y|s+ i)2 +Q(y|1)2∑
1≤i′≤k′ Q(y|s+ i′) +Q(y|1)
+
∑k′
i=1Q(y|1)(Q(y|1)−Q(y|s+ i))∑
1≤i′≤k′ Q(y|s+ i′) +Q(y|1)
−Q(y|1)
)
≤
∑
y∈Y
(
max
i
Q(y|i) +
∑k′
i=2Q(y|1)(eε − 1)Q(y|s+ i)∑
≤i′≤k′ Q(y|s+ i′) +Q(y|1)
−Q(y|1)
)
≤
∑
y∈Y
(
max
i
Q(y|i) +Q(y|1)(eε − 1)−Q(y|1)
)
. (30)
To proceed, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 2. For all set M ⊂ Y, ∀i ∈ [k], we have:
∑
y∈M
Q(y|i) ≤ 1− e−ε
1−∑
y∈M
Q(y|1)
.
Proof.
∑
y∈M
Q(y|i) = 1−
∑
y∈Mc
Q(y|i) ≤ 1− e−ε
∑
y∈Mc
Q(y|1) = 1− e−ε
1−∑
y∈M
Q(y|1)
.
Next, we partition output set Y into k subsets, where ∀t ∈ [k],
Mt = {y ∈ Y| arg max
i∈[k]
Q(y|i) = t}.
23
Then combining (30) and Lemma 2, we have:
∑
y∈Y
k∑
i=1
(Q(y|i)−Q(y|1))2∑
1≤i′≤kQ(y|i′)
≤ (eε − 1) +
∑
t∈[k]
∑
y∈Mt
(Q(y|t)−Q(y|1))
≤(eε − 1) +
∑
t∈[k]
1− e−ε
1− ∑
y∈Mt
Q(y|1)
− ∑
y∈Mt
Q(y|1)

=(eε − 1) +
∑
t∈[k]
(1− e−ε)(1−
∑
y∈Mt
Q(y|1)) = O(kε).
D.2 Proof of (21)
Define Q(y|j, i) = Pr (Y = y|X = (j, i)), we have:
χ2(Q|PZ) =
∑
y∈Y
∑m
j=1
16k2jα
2
(
∑m
t=1 k
2
t )
2
∑
i∈[kj/2] (Q(y|j, 2i)−Q(y|j, 2i− 1))
2
1
k
∑m
j=1
∑
i∈[kj ]Q(y|j, i)
≤ kα
2∑m
t=1 k
2
t
∑
y∈Y
∑m
j=1
16k2j∑m
t=1 k
2
t
∑
i∈[kj/2] (Q(y|j, 2i)−Q(y|j, 2i− 1))
2∑m
j=1
∑
i∈[kj ]Q(y|j, i)
. (31)
Within each block Xj , the elements satisfy classic ε-LDP. It is proved in [31] that ∀j ∈ [m], i ∈ [kj ],
(Q(y|j, 2i)−Q(y|j, 2i− 1))2 ≤ (e
ε − 1)2
k2j
∑
i∈[kj ]
Q(y|j, i)
2.
Hence we have
χ2(Q|PZ) ≤ kα
2(eε − 1)2∑m
t=1 k
2
t
∑
y∈Y
∑m
j=1
8kj∑m
t=1 k
2
t
(∑
i∈[kj ]Q(y|j, i)
)2∑m
j=1
∑
i∈[kj ]Q(y|j, i)
≤ kα
2(eε − 1)2∑m
t=1 k
2
t
∑
y∈Y
m∑
j=1
8kj∑m
t=1 k
2
t
∑
i∈[kj ]
Q(y|j, i)

=
kα2(eε − 1)2∑m
t=1 k
2
t
m∑
j=1
8kj∑m
t=1 k
2
t
∑
y∈Y
∑
i∈[kj ]
Q(y|j, i)

≤ kα
2(eε − 1)2∑m
t=1 k
2
t
m∑
j=1
8kj∑m
t=1 k
2
t
× kj
≤ 8kα
2(eε − 1)2∑m
t=1 k
2
t
= O
(
kα2ε2∑m
t=1 k
2
t
)
. (32)
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